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THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM & EQUALITY
IN SCHOOLING
Frank J.Macchiarola*
Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky**
Alan Gartner***

Introduction
Judicial participation in the process of policy making in public
education has become commonplace in America. From defining
constitutional issues as in Brown v. Board of Education,' the
landmark 1954 decision declaring racially segregated public school
systems "inherently unequal,"2 courts have increasingly been called
upon to resolve education issues beyond the constitutional realm.
Statutes and the administrative regulations of state and local educational institutions have come under judicial scrutiny with increasing frequency. For as regulations themselves have grown in
* LL.B., Columbia University School of Law; Ph.D., Columbia University; Dean
and Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, and
Professor of Political Science, Yeshiva University. The author served as Chancellor of
New York City's Public Schools from 1978 to 1983.
** Ph.D., Hofstra University; Director, the National Center on Educational Restructuring and Inclusion, The Graduate School and University Center, The City University of New York. The author is a former school superintendent, and Chief
Administrator, Division of Special Education, New York City Public Schools, she has
written or co-authored many articles and books on education policy of persons with
disabilities.
*** Ph.D., Union Graduate School; Dean for Research and University Programs,
The Graduate School and University Center, The City University of New York, Professor, The Graduate School and University Center, The City University of New
York. The author has written or edited more than twenty books on social policy,
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Public Schools.
The authors wish to acknowledge and express their appreciation to Julie Rieder and
Hugh Zanger, members of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law's Class of 1995,
for their invaluable assistance in researching and preparing this article.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 495.
3. See, e.g., Mrs. A. J. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 431 (D. Minn.
1979); Eberle v. Bd. of Pub., Educ., 444 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d
1274 (3d Cir. 1978) (Both cases interpret the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-230, tit. VI § 601, 84 (1970), amended by The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774 (1975), amended by The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1990)).
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number and scope-many regulations in the form of the now
dreaded "mandates"-parties have sought judicial intervention to
sustain the rights that they have urged.
Nevertheless, all too often judicial intervention has shown itself
to be inattentive to a philosophy of education and a sense of what
school effectiveness is about. For with all of the new judicial activity and with all of the effort to guarantee rights-particularly for
students-the quality and effectiveness of public education, especially in our urban schools, has stalled.' It is troubling-indeed,
tragic-that notwithstanding the increased participation of the
courts, our schools seem to be deteriorating. 5
Whatever the other benefits of judicial decisions, the courts, as
they have become more involved with schools, have often been inattentive to, or even in opposition to, many practices that could be
of great help in permitting schools to be better places for children.
For while the courts have often identified the basic issues of student rights most appropriately, the solutions they have proposed
have a stifling effect upon the development of good school practice
in at least two significant ways.
First, an activist judicial role has resulted in excessive legal entanglement in the daily affairs of those charged with running public
schools.6 Although not a legal maxim, the notion that "too many
cooks spoil the broth" can be said to describe this phenomenon.
Often, through the use of court orders and judicially supervised
consent decrees, the courts have had their impact on the classroom
while teachers and administrators are left without room for their
4. No single body of data can document the state of American education; perhaps the best single source is the National Assessment of Educational Progress, the
so-called "nation's report card." While there has been some recent progress, in mathematics, for example, overall the results remain limited. For example, almost a third
of the nation's high school seniors cannot answer accurately basic geography questions, nearly two-thirds fail similarly basic history questions, and even in mathematics,
where there has been some improvement, only 16 percent of seniors meet the requirements set by the National Educational Goals Panel.
5. See, e.g., Mike Bowler, Scores Rise Where Suburbs Grow, BALTIMORE SUN,
Jan. 24, 1995, at 2B; Sharon L. Bass, Connecticut Q & A: John Dow Jr., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1988, at 12CN3; Robert Conot, Carnegie Panel Calls for Urban School Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1988, at 3.

6. For example, the New York City Public Schools face court orders or consent
decrees concerning teacher assignment, student placement, school finance, special education, and bilingual education. See, e.g., Lora v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F. Supp. 1572
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (order regarding the education of emotionally disturbed children);
Aspira of New York Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (regarding
consent decree entitling New York City public school students of Hispanic origin to a
program of bilingual education).
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decision making. There is the sense that there are too many courtordered rules and directives to be observed.7 In many ways, courts
have sought judicial solutions with respect to issues regarding public education where prudence has dictated greater restraint.
In addition to the courts extending the hand of justice directly
into the classroom, judicial "offsprings," judicial remedies, the administration of consent decrees, and the excessive supervision to
guarantee compliance, seem to be ever present. What too many in
the judicial system fail to realize is that when their case has been
concluded-by decision, or negotiated settlement-the task of implementation has just begun. If an educator is looking for an excuse not to be effective in the classroom, the specter that the courts
have preempted the matter of how the instruction should be carried on, real or imagined, is enough to justify that inaction.
Classroom teaching is affected by what educators are told they
must do, and what they cannot do. Often the judicial system makes
educators feel unimportant, or not responsible, in the schooling of
youngsters. Thus, rather than seeking to implement the student's
rights, the educator often feels that the task has been taken away.
This has occurred precisely at the point in time when the literature
of school improvement is calling upon them to exercise greater responsibility in the schooling of our children.
A second negative consequence of judicial activism in education
is that educational policy making itself has been influenced more
by the need to deal with the articulated legal rights of individuals
than by the need to advance good school practice for all students
within the larger definition of those rights. An overly active judiciary has suggested that courts have more answers to student success
than they actually do. In that regard, they devalue the critical importance of the usual school activity. The result of this is seen in
the differences in expenditures between students classified as handicapped and the typical student.8
The court's priorities are based upon legal entitlements, so that
student rights are "given" by the law. In the literature of school
improvement, however, students are called upon to empower
themselves, and to assert their rights in the learning community. 9
They are successful when they take charge of their lives, not when
7. Id.
8. See infra text accompanying note 79.
9. E.g., Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky, We Need a Third Wave of EducationalReform,
22 Soc. POL'Y 43, 44-45 (1992).
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they are passive in the process."0 They are successful when they
associate with other students, not when they are isolated from
them, or are specially treated.' Yet, judicial rules about special
education, 2 bilingual education' 3 and entitlements of one type or
another have come to take students out of their interaction with
4
others.'
Because judicial activism in public education has had a negative
impact on school effectiveness, this Article seeks to define a proper
role for the courts in education policy-a role that would be more
effective in obtaining quality education for our nation's youngsters.
It is based on the assumption that equality is a basic principle that
governs both sound law and sound educational policy. It further
proceeds on the assumption that the goal of education, at least
from the students' perspective, is to permit them the fullest attainment of educational benefits. Thus, the Article examines and compares how the right to an education within a framework of equality
has been defined by both educators and the courts. Unlike most
analyses of the cases dealing with education, this Article examines
them in the context of what educators have determined is good
school practice. With this backdrop, the Article examines whether
the development of the law of public education has been as positive as it could be. It further analyzes where the development of
the law has and has not been compatible with the strategies for
school improvement which have been shown to be most effective.
This Article also examines how the concept of equality has
played out in the efforts of the courts to define student rights in
several important areas. These include school prayer and flag salute cases, racial discrimination, cases concerning students whose
native language is not English, and cases concerning students with
disabilities. The common denominator in each of these areas is the
way in which differences among students are treated and how the
notion of equality has been considered in the context of those differences. Thus, the Article examines how, in these areas, differences are first conceptualized and then addressed by the courts.
Part I of this Article discusses good school practices and addresses the educational methods which have been proven to be effective. The common thread in effective educational doctrine is
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
E.g., Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982).
Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See discussion infra parts LE, II.C, II.F.
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that programs which integrate and include students are often the
most effective educational method on many levels. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's approach to education. This part
shows that the Court has not always been clear in enunciating a
policy of equality in the classroom. Part III contains our opinions
on what to do to improve education jurisprudence. Our conclusions require the law to alter its thinking in educational matters,
and change its approach to one that substantially appreciates the
need for equality in our schools.
I. Defining Good School Practice
A.

Educational Perspectives on Equality
Research regarding school effectiveness clearly indicates that the
students' sense of participation and belonging profoundly affects
educational outcomes for children.' 5 If children are made to feel
unequal, and undervalued, their capacity to be educated is severely
diminished. 16 For a school to be effective, its students must also be
convinced that not only can they succeed, but that teachers and
other school personnel believe they can succeed.' 7 Indeed, for a
school to be effective students must sense that these adults feel a
8
responsibility toward the achievement of student success.'
Thus, understanding the student's own role in the learning process is critical for successfully improving our schools. The student
must be seen as an active participant in the learning process;1 9 the
student cannot be viewed as a funnel into which the teacher's
knowledge is poured or as a passive consumer. Rather, the student
must be viewed as the "producer" of his or her own learning.
While teachers and others can teach, it is only the student who can
learn. The student is thus a "worker" in her or his own learning.
As generations of teachers have realized, they cannot learn for
their students; it is the student who must do the learning. Giving students respect, building upon their knowledge, providing
them control over the learning process and appropriate materi15. The basic research is that of Ronald R. Edmonds, with many subsequent studies. See Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Schools for the Urban Poor, 37 EDUCATIONAL
LEADERSHIP 15, 18, 20-24 (1979); Ronald R. Edmonds, Some Schools Work and More
Can, 9 Soc. POL'Y 28, 28-29, 31 (1979).
16. Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Schools for the Urban Poor, 37 EDUCATIONAL
LEADERSHIP 15, 15-18, 20-24 (1979).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19.

ALAN GARTNER & FRANK REISSMAN, THE SERVICE SOCIETY AND THE CON-

SUMER VANGUARD

(1974); Lipsky, supra note 9, at 43-45.
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als, helping them to see the connection between subjects, encouraging cooperation among students-these are the necessary
predicates to increases in student learning, the bases for significant improvement of our schools.2 °
The courts have a responsibility to insure at least that their decisions establishing student rights do not interfere with sound pedagogic practices which place enormous responsibility upon the
student working within the school community. This Article first
examines the educational literature on classroom success, it examines the education cases, and, finally, the connection (and disconnection) between the two.
B. The Effective School
What do we know about effective schools? More precisely, what
do we mean by an "effective school"? First, we define school effectiveness in terms of academic, social, and behavioral outcomes for
students. Second, we are concerned with equity issues and must
compare the outcomes for all students, including non-white children, those whose families are poor, those whose first language is
not English, and those with disabilities.
There is neither an established platform for effective schools nor
a universally agreed upon list of characteristics of school effectiveness. 21 Nonetheless, it is possible, for the purposes of this Article,
to distill the characteristics of effective schooling. By way of illustration, a survey assessing the results of the decade following the
publication of A Nation at Risk 22 reports that:
[T]he reform movement at all levels has had positive impacts on
a number of areas, including changes in course-taking, classroom instruction, and the teacher pipeline, as well as improvements in dropout rates, achievement as measured by test scores,
student eligibility for higher education and equality.23
Regarding "equity" issues, defined as improvements among minority and majority students, and between male and female students, 24 the authors of this survey noted studies which reported
that dropout rates have declined faster for minorities than for
20. Lipsky, supra note 9, at 43.

21.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA

22.

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION,

& THOMAS

HAUSER, FOR OUR CHILDREN 9

A

(1985).

NATION AT

RISK, U.S. Government Printing Office (1983).
23. M.W. Kurst & C. Kelley, Positive Impacts of Reform Efforts in the 1980s, A
NATION AT RISK: TEN YEARS LATER

24. Id.

(1993).
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other students;25 that basic skills as well as SAT test scores have
risen more rapidly;26 that course-taking patterns have changed as
well, with large increases for minority students,27 and increases in
mathematics and science for female students which outpace increases for males.28
More than a decade ago, Ronald R. Edmonds2 9 identified five
factors that characterize effective schools. These are:
1. The principal's leadership and attention to the quality of
instruction;
2. A pervasive and broadly understood instructional focus;
3. An orderly, safe climate conducive to teaching and learning;
4. Teacher behaviors that convey the expectation that all students are expected to obtain at least minimum mastery; and
5. The use of measures of pupil achievement as the basis for
program evaluation.3 °
Lawrence Lezotte, who directs the National Center of Effective
Schools Research and Development, notes that, "Since that initial
listing, many other studies have cross-validated the original findings. Some of the more recent studies have added additional factors, and others have sought to make ' the
original Edmonds factors
31
more explicit and more operational.
Lezotte further expanded upon Edmonds' five factors. First he
holds the conviction that the primary mission of the public schools
should be learning for all and this conviction is predicated upon
three beliefs:
First, all students can learn. Second, the individual school has
control of enough of the critical variables to assure 32such learning. Third, schools should be accountable to do so.
Turning from the characteristics of effective schools, Lezotte then
identifies five guiding principles for creating such schools:
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. Ronald R. Edmonds, Programsin School Improvement: An Overview, 40 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP

4 (1982).

30. Id. at 4.
31. Lawrence W. Lezotte, School Improvement Based on the Effective Schools Research, BEYOND SEPARATE EDUCATION: QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL 29 (Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky & Alan Gartner eds., 1989).
32. Lawrence W. Lezotte, Learn From Effective Schools 22 Soc. POL'Y 3, 34
(1992).
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1. Preserve the single school as the strategic unit for the
planned change;
2. Principals, though essential as leaders of change, can not do
it alone and, thus, teachers and others must be an integral part of
the school improvement process;
3. School improvement, like any change, is best approached as
a process, not an event. Such a process approach is more likely to
create a permanent change in the operating culture of the school
that will accommodate this new function called continuous school
improvement;
4. Research, to be useful in facilitating the change process,
must include suggestions for practices, policies, and procedures to
be implemented as part of that process; and
5. Like those at the original effective schools, those improving
schools must feel as if they have a choice in the matter and, equally
as important, they must feel as if they have control over the process
of change.33
Herbert J. Walberg and Herbert J. Walberg III provide powerful
evidence in support of Lezotte's first principle.34 Citing studies
that control for educational costs and student demographics, they
conclude that, "[s]tates with large districts and large schools, and
which pay more of the costs of primary and secondary education,
tend to have the lowest student achievement. ' ' 35 Despite these
findings, during the past half-century, states have created everlarger schools and districts, and have increasingly concentrated
funding responsibility on state rather than local authorities. 36 Walberg and Walberg, in noting this trend, conclude that "[t]heory,
previous research, and the new analysis reported here strongly suggest that these trends have been counterproductive for education's
chief purpose-learning. ' 37 In explaining this, they suggest that:
The worrisome trends identified here may be a part of a larger
problem: "intergovernmentalism," which means making more
levels and units.of government responsible for the affairs of individuals. Common sense tells us that when all are nominally responsible, none is truly responsible. In writing on this subject,
John Kincaid concluded: 'Virtually all of the factors most associated with academically effective education are school- and
33. Lezotte, supra note 31, at 31
34. Herbert J. Walberg & Herbert J. Walberg III, Losing Local Control,53
CATIONAL RESEARCHER 19, 19-26 (1994).

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

EDU-
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neighborhood-based. Yet, we have shifted more control
and
38
funding of education to state and national institutions.'
Moreover, in a significant way, this drive toward greater control
outside of the individual school has been encouraged by judicial
decisions which have driven toward equality in funding formulas as
well as equality in the classroom setting. Size itself, of course, is
not the issue. Rather, it is what small size leads to that makes a
difference for students. We learn from Walberg and Walberg's
study that in smaller schools, students who would otherwise be
marginalized are noticed and encouraged to participate. 39 The results of participation are clear: students' achievement, empathy and
social skills improve and they are less likely to use drugs, be deviant and feel lonely.40 This is in part due to the greater incidence of
mixed aged grouping, peer tutoring and reciprocal teaching that is
found in a small school setting.4
Other lessons Walberg and Walberg gleaned from their observations of small schools include the fact that teachers and students
are more likely to focus on substance because both are free from
burdens of school bureaucracy.4 2 Parents are more likely to be involved in a small school and know their child's teachers and principal. Students have better attendance records and are more likely
to participate in school activities. 3 And, as a qualitative matter,
smaller high schools promote student satisfaction and sense of belonging." In most respects, Walberg and Walberg's study shows
that the community orientation fostered in smaller schools improves students' likelihood of having a successful and socially beneficial scholastic experience. 5 It is clear that among those who
study effective schools, the amount of resources alone available to
each school is not as powerful an indicator of school success as one
might think.
C.

Effective School Practice: Reconsidering Intelligence and
Knowledge
Assessing effective school practice must focus on pedagogy-instructional practices, curricula, school and class organization. Re38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 26.
Id.
Walberg & Walberg, supra note 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cent literature challenges our traditional notions of what
constitutes intelligence and knowledge. The impact of these new
theories is that we must reconsider the effectiveness of our current
pedagogical methods.
1.

Reconsidering Intelligence

Historically, schools have been organized based on "the concept
of intelligence as a single general capacity which equips its possessor to deal more or less effectively with any situation. ' 46 However,
Howard Gardner 47 has developed the concept of "multiple intelligences" (MI), which paints a more variegated and contextualized
picture of intelligence by positing a number of intelligences.
MI theory suggests some compelling alternatives to current educational practices in several areas. According to MI theory, traditional school focuses upon linguistic and logical-mathematical
intelligences should be reconsidered to address other human abilities and talents.48 This shift in educational emphasis should be
complemented by an attendant shift in instructional conditions.49
Moreover, according to MI theory, standardized, machine scored,
multiple choice tests are inadequate measures of intelligence because they do not address each intelligence.50 Theoretically, MI
theory indicates that anything less than independent analysis of
each intelligence is an insufficient measure of intelligence.
MI theory emphasizes the concept of the learner; each individual
has a highly individualized way of learning due to their distinctive
combination of intelligences. In this regard, MI theory calls into
question prevailing educational policies. Fundamentally, Tina
Blythe and Howard Gardner hypothesize that using the same
methods and materials for all students may be an ineffectual way of
teaching.51 Gardner's MI theory demands a sophisticated approach to education based upon the recognition of students'
individuality.
46. Tina Blythe & Howard Gardner, A School for All Intelligences, 47
TIONAL LEADERSHIP

EDUCA-

33, 33 (1990).

47. HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (2d ed. 1985).

48. Id. at 3-4.
49. Id. at 10, 388-92.
50. Blythe & Gardner, supra note 46, at 34.
51. Blythe & Gardner, supra note 46.
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2. Reconsidering Knowledge
Just as Gardner asserts that students possess multiple intelligences, Gaea Leinhardt believes "that knowledge varies both
within and across subject-matter areas" 2 and that there is a social
nature of learning.
First, learning is an active process of knowledge construction
and sense-making by the student. Second, knowledge is a cultural artifact of human beings: we produce it, share it, and
transform it as individuals and as groups. Third, knowledge is
distributed among members of a group, and this distributed
knowledge is greater than the knowledge possessed by any single member.5 3
Under Leinhardt's model, teachers are guides. Their role is to escort the student through the group's knowledge ("metaknowledge") and to debate ideas and interpretations of the students. 4
The ultimate question, according to Leinhardt, is how to use
knowledge to help individuals and groups gain more knowledge.
D.

The Impact of Expectations in Education Theory

In surveying the research on compensatory and remedial programs, Lorin W. Anderson and Leonard 0. Pellicer state that these
"programs are often so poorly coordinated with regular programs
that student learning is actually impeded. ' 56 They also point to
the low expectations that teachers in these programs have for their
students and a tendency to teach to their present levels of functioning rather
than to the levels they will need to be successful in the
57
future.
This same issue of low expectations is cited by Adam Gamoran
in addressing the equity issues of ability grouping. 8 According to
Gamoran, not only do teachers have lower expectations for "lowtrack" students, but students' expectations for themselves differ
52. Gaea Leinhardt, What Research on Learning Tells Us About Teaching,49
CATIONAL LEADERSHIP

EDU-

20, 20 (1992).

53. Id at 23.
54. Id at 24.
55. Id at 23.
56. Lorin W. Anderson & Leonard 0. Pellicer, Synthesis of Research on Compensatory and Remedial Education, 48 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 10, 11 (1990).
57. Id
58. Ability grouping refers to "divisions among students for particular subjects,
such as special class assignments for math or within class groups for reading." Adam
Gamoran, Synthesis of Research: Is Ability Grouping Equitable?, 50 EDUCATIONAL
LEADERSHIP 11, 13 (1992).
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across tracks and ability groups. In summarizing the data on ability
grouping, he concludes, "grouping and tracking rarely add to overall achievement in a school, but they often contribute to inequality."59 Thus, determinations that youngsters are entitled to special
status actually have a negative impact.
In a survey of "what works" to prevent early school failure, Robert E. Slavin, Nancy L. Karweit, and Barbara A. Wasik conclude
that learning disabled children will only need intensive intervention for a short period, not to last beyond their first grade. 60 Thereafter, the authors perceive that what is really needed in every
elementary school classroom is a general improvement in the quality of classroom instruction and that achieving this goal is simply a
matter of resource allocation. They found that:
[V]irtually every child can succeed in the early grades in principle. The number who will succeed in fact depends on the resources we are willing to devote to ensuring success for all and
to our willingness to reconfigure the resources we already
61
devote to remedial and special education and related services.
Their research indicated that "early school failure is fundamentally
preventable." 62 And theoretically, they argue that school failure
can be entirely eradicated. The solution, focuses upon all children.
E. Indusive Programs
63
The National Center on Education Restructuring and Inclusion
has evaluated data concerning school restructuring efforts that affect outcomes for all students, including those with disabilities.
These inclusive education schools and communities believe that
schools can only be equitable if all of their students are in general
education classrooms, being educated alongside of each other. 64

59. Id. at 13.
60. Robert E. Slavin, Nancy L. Karweit, & Barbara A. Wasik, Preventing Early
School Failure: What Works?, 50 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 10, 16 (1992).
61. Id
62. Id.
63. The National Center on Educational Restructuring and Inclusion was established at The Graduate School and University Center, The City University of New
York, to address issues of national and local policy; disseminate information about
programs, practices, evaluation, and funding; provide training and technical assistance; build a network of inclusion districts; identify individuals with expertise in inclusion and restructuring; conduct research; and infuse inclusion into educational
restructuring.
64. NATIONAL CENTER ON EDUCATIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND INCLUSION, THE
GRADUATE SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CENTER, THE CITY UNIV. OF NEW YORK, NATIONAL STUDY OF INCLUSIVE EDUCATION (1995).
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Given the limited time period in which inclusive education programs have been implemented, there have been relatively few fullscale evaluations of outcomes. There are statewide studies underway, however, in Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, Utah and
Vermont.65 Michigan's Inclusive Education Recommendations
Committee, based on a comprehensive survey of the literature,
stated: "While there is currently little quantitative data of statistical
significance to support full inclusion, there are clear patterns
among the research that indicate improved outcomes as a result of
integrated placements." 66
Summarizing a number of individual studies, Gretchen B. Rossman and Janet Salzman 67 report that where students came from
separate classes, there was a substantial increase in time in general
education classrooms; students with learning disabilities made academic gains as reflected in scores on criterion-referenced tests and
report cards; 68 students with significant disabilities had greater success in achieving IEP goals 69 than did matched students in traditional programs;70 benefits to students with disabilities occurred
without curtailing the educational program available to nondisabled students; 71 and gains occurred in student self-esteem, acceptance by classmates, and social skills.72
A multi-year study of inclusive education in Vermont, the state
with the most extensive inclusion programs, reports grades for students served in general education settings were not significantly
different than their grades had been in separate special education
programs; 73 and that general education teachers, special educators,
parents, and the students themselves judge students to have comparable performance in the general education class settings in all
65. Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky & Alan Gartner, The Evaluation of Inclusive Educa-

tion Programs, NCERI

BULLETIN

2 (1995).

66.

DEP'T OF EDUC., LANSING, MI, FINAL REPORT OF THE INCLUSIVE EDUCATION RECOMMENDATIONS COMMITTEE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1993).

67. Gretchen B. Rossman & Janet Salzman, Evaluating Inclusive Education Programs: A Survey of Current Practice (1994). (A paper prepared for the National
Center on Educational Restructuring and Inclusion invitational conference on inclusive education, Wingspread (WI) Conference Center).

68. Id.
69. IEP goals are the goals set for the individual student on her/his Individualized
Educational Program.

70. Rossman & Salzman, supra note 67.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. VERMONT

DEP'T OF EDUC., VERMONT'S ACT
REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF ACT 230 (1994).

230:

THREE YEARS LATER,

A
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categories measured (e.g., behavior, social interactions, classroom

performance, and overall success).74
Edward T. Baker, Margaret C. Wang and Herbert J. Walberg
summarized the findings from three meta-analyses concerning the
most effective setting for the education of students with disabilities. 75 "These effect sizes demonstrate a small-to-moderate beneficial effect of inclusive education on the academic and social
outcomes of special-needs children.... [This] means that specialneeds students educated in regular classes do better academically
' 76
and socially than comparable students in noninclusive settings.
Debbie Staub and Charles A. Peck addressed the outcomes for
nondisabled students in inclusive settings, and report that inclusion
does not reduce their academic progress, that they do not lose
teacher time or attention, and that they do not learn undesirable
behaviors.77
Based on the above discussed studies of education and learning,
we can draw several conclusions which should be included in our
legal dialogue. First, inclusion is a key to more successful programs. Students function best in an environment where they are
the drivers of the educational process. Second, inclusive programs,
where students learn from and with each other, as well as from the
teacher, give students the more active role they need in the education process. Such programs, not surprisingly, are routinely better
programs than segregated alternatives. Finally, inclusive programs
are more important than additional resources used for other
purposes.
II. Judicial Approaches to Education Policy

Although educational researchers report gains by students educated in inclusionary settings, particularly by special education students, the courts have not always ruled in accordance with these
findings. Indeed, all too often parties in court proceedings have
discouraged inclusionary settings. Plaintiffs want greater entitlements and more resources spent, and defendants want to craft special settings for the students. Thus, for example, increased isolation
74. Id
75. Edward T. Baker, Margaret C. Wang, and Herbert J. Walberg, Synthesis of
Research: The Effects of Inclusion on Learning, 52 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 33
(1994).
76. Id at 34.
77. Debbie Staub & Charles A. Peck, What Are the Outcomes for Nondisabled

Students?, 52

EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP

36, 36-37 (1994).
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for special education and bilingual education students rather than
inclusion and increased effectiveness for all students has too often
been the result of judicial intervention.78 Because both parties
seek something special, courts are left in a position where they are
incapable of constructing appropriate remedies based upon equity
for all students. Rather, the courts try to achieve equity for some
students and inevitably fail. Unfortunately, all too often the remedy that courts produce-particularly in bilingual education or special education cases-tends to maximize the differences among
students and be more costly. For example, New York City's current per pupil cost of $6,394 compares with a per pupil cost of
$19,288 for special education youngsters 79 who because of judicial,
legislative and administrative mandates, are often educated in segregated settings.8 0 The New York City problem in special education is based on a court order, Jose P. v. Ambach,8 ' that has
resulted in practices of exclusion despite the mounting evidence
that suggests that inclusion-where children are treated equallycreates better outcomes for students. 82
In Ambach, the Second Circuit affirmed a finding that the New
York City and State school authorities had failed to meet the standards set by the Education of the Handicapped Act.83 The Court
also affirmed the lower court's appointment of a special master to
develop a plan to insure that the schools "take all actions reasonably necessary to accomplish timely evaluation and placement in
appropriate programs of all children with handicapping conditions." 84 The irony of the district court's resolution is that its order
was based upon sound legal policy-to insure that the rights of
children with disabilities are protected-yet it opted for an obvious
panacea rather than good educational policy such as the policies of
inclusion.8 5
The courts did not begin their intervention into public education
with a drive to set new policy in many areas of education. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has declared that there is no Constitutional
78. See discussion infra parts II.C, II.F.
79. These figures come from the school system's data.
80. OFFICE OF BUDGET OPERATIONS & REVIEW, NEW YORK

CITY BD.OF EDUC.,

1994-1995 (1995).
81. Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982).

CHANCELLOR'S BUDGET REQUEST FOR

82. See supra part I.
83.
cation
84.
85.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1986), amended by Individuals with Disabilities EduAct, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1990); Ambach, 669 F.2d at 868.
Ambach, 669 F.2d at 867.
Id.
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right to an education because it is not "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. ' 86 Nevertheless, at the same time, the
Supreme Court provided a framework for the consideration of certain student rights. It has praised public education as an institution
"intrinsic to American national identity and culture '87 and has intervened frequently and profoundly "to implement such far reaching reforms as":
[R]acial desegregation of the public schools, the delineation
of the extent of students' free speech rights and freedom of belief while in the schoolhouse, protection of public schools' discretion to include evolution in the science curriculum, and
protection of the right of school-age illegal alien children to free
public schooling.88
This judicial activism and philosophy is hardly in keeping with
the passive spirit enunciated in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.89 However, these cases reflect that when important basic principles have been described, the goals of public
schooling have usually involved notions of equality and integration.
According to most who have examined the issue, "[t]he public
schools have, indeed, been agents of assimilation," 9° assimilating
groups who are participating in a larger society. 91 Yet, a more important function of public education is to facilitate a child's growth
and learning in a safe, inclusive environment where the child is
truly respected in the process. As to these important purposes of
education, legal scholars are often in agreement with educators.
For example, courts have recognized that:
Attention must also be given to the emotional effects that substitution or exclusion may have on the child. Children, particularly teenagers, are acutely conscious of differences among
86. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
87. Susan H. Bitensky, TheoreticalFoundationsfor a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution:A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U.
L. REV. 550, 589 (1992) (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
88. Id. at n.232-35 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982)).
89. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

90. Kenneth L. Karst, Essay, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 334 n.202 (1986) (citing M.GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN
AMERICAN LIFE 23 (1964)).
91. Id.
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students. Requiring a student to leave class in front of peers is
often embarrassing, and the child may be subject to challenge or
ridicule later. Even if the student could go directly to the alternative location, class absences might still be questioned by other
students.92

Thus, the law recognizes that children excluded from classroom activities will routinely experience feelings of isolation and confusion,
but the law's sense of such an issue seems to be poorly developed
and often contradictory. For instance, preventing student isolation
in the traditional civil rights cases after Brown v. Board of Education,9 3 has been central to the philosophy of the courts. In Brown
v. Board of Education,94 the Supreme Court attacked a critical and
historically recognized facet of isolation which occurs in instances
of racial segregation. In holding that deliberate separation of minority students violates the equal protection clause, the Court
found that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."5

In support of its holding, the Brown Court spoke of the injury to
96
segregated children from the imposition of a feeling of inferiority.
The central aim of Brown was the elimination of the developmental harm to segregated students resulting from a loss of the intangible benefits of an equal and integrated education.97 Over time,
however, that goal has been sacrificed. It has certainly been lost in
the bilingual education cases, to be discussed later, where it appears that segregation has been practically mandated. Furthermore, it has now been lost in the traditional civil rights cases as
well, where the focus has been on acts of segregation, rather than
on the goals of integration.

92. Kiply S. Shobe, Note, 'Public Education in Shreds': Religious Challenges to
CurricularDecisions, 64 IND. L.J. 111, 118 (1988). See also it at 118 n.38 (noting that
this rationale has been central to judicial decisions in education cases which involved
Establishment Clause issues, including Abington Township Sch. Dist. V. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school
prayer); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (moment of silence in classroom); Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (mandatory flag salute)).
93. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 495.

96. Id. at 494.
97. William L. Christopher, Note, Ignoring the Soul of Brown: Boardof Education

v. Dowell, 70 N.C. L. REv. 615, 627 (1992).
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The Civil Rights Cases

In the 1991 decision of Board of Education v. Dowell,98 the
Supreme Court considered the question of when judicial supervision of segregation should end. The Court's language backed away
from the standard of equality that was presented in Brown v.
Board of Education and instead focused upon the issue of state
action that had been the basis for requiring desegregation. In his
dissent in Dowell, Justice Marshall maintained that any standard
for the dissolution of a desegregation decree must reflect the primary aim of Brown: to eliminate the "stigmatic injury" of inferiority implicit in segregated education.9 9 Thus, Justice Marshall
espoused the view that the Court's analysis should focus on the
results of the desegregation decree. Yet the majority ignored the
effectiveness of the order and looked at the actions of the school
district and assessed the district's role in maintaining segregation. 10 The district could not stem the white flight that resegregated the schools in the district.' 0 ' The Dowell case represents the
Supreme Court's inability to prevent the increasing "return" to
separate, segregated schools notwithstanding the promise of
Brown. The Dowell Court endorsed terminations of court-ordered
desegregation so long as good faith compliance with desegregation
orders are shown, regardless of the level of continuing segregation. 10 2 As a result, the Supreme Court decided that on remand the
district court could enter findings that while one-race or racially
identifiable schools may resemble segregation, they do not constitute the pre-Brown mode of segregation so as to render them unlawful, since the segregation is a result of private choice rather than
state action. 10 3 There are now several districts where desegregation orders are being set aside,' °4 not because segregation has
ended, but because such orders have lost their meaning. In a legal
sense, state action responsible for segregation has not happened. In
a political sense, we have lost interest in racial equality.
98. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
99. Id. at 251.
100. Id. at 249-50
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 242-43, 250.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 237, 249-51.
See, e.g., Riddick v. The Sch. Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 543-44

(4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986), where the court found that white
flight from public schools, and the representative black population in classroom per-

centages indicated that de jure segregation did not exist, and the school board acted
reasonably in adopting its integration plan over the desegregation plan.

1996]

EQUALITY IN SCHOOLING

The result in Dowell is certainly understandable in terms of judicial precedent. In Liddell v. Missouri,05 the court refused to order
city and suburban districts to share the task of integration. 10 6 For
those who believe in inclusion, the appropriate analysis would better turn on whether the public school systems in place are denying
students an equal opportunity. The integration of all students
within a restructured and unitary school system might be the only
remedy available if the goal of equality and the need for inclusion
is treated as a primary value. "Although not always mentioned explicitly, 'denial of equal opportunity' is typically a central, underlying concern in Fourteenth Amendment litigation that involves such
volatile areas as school desegregation, school finance, handicapped
rights (including the rights of AIDS-infected students), standardized testing and bilingual education.' 10 7 However, when those issues are secondary to an analysis of state action, the courts have
effectively allowed the basic education rights of students to be
sacrificed.
Sound Educational Policy, the Law, and Minority Students
The failure of the courts to promote the principle of equality
helps to explain why growing numbers of African-American parents are "turning away from this integrative ideal" and favoring allblack schools or predominantly African-American neighborhood
schools.'0 8 The integration that had been promised since Brown,
but so sparingly delivered, has not resulted in integration in many
of our urban schools and it has not produced the hoped for improvement of the quality of educational opportunities for AfricanAmericans.
However, the failure to implement Brown fully should not lead
to a return to segregation and yet it seems to be doing so. The
message of Brown and the message of good school practice are
abundantly clear: the stigma associated with segregation does affect a child's educational achievement. Although judicial approaches to desegregation may have produced unsatisfactory
results, integration and equality remain to be tried as a legal standard. Brown's relatively narrow legal message was that a state
B.

105. 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
106. Id. at 1326.
107. Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of EducationalPolicy After Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1082 (1989).
108. Drew S. Days, III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 53, 54 (1992).

586

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII

could not enforce discriminatory policies; state action, rather than
the racial composition of schools, was the triggering concept for
judicial protection of students. This limited view adopted by the
Court flies in the face of public perceptions of Brown and a sense
of how momentous the decision actually was. Thurgood Marshall's
broad, forceful vision of equality in the classroom has yet to be
given effect.' 0 9
The problem goes beyond questions of white flight and urban
schools. The problem of achieving Marshall's vision is further complicated by the fact that even in schools with a racially mixed stu-

dent body, classrooms are racially segregated. 110 As Drew S. Days,
III notes: "In many schools, racially segregated classes make it unlikely that children of different races will have meaningful interac-

tion during the school day.""'
Too many African-American children are still receiving the preBrown message that they "don't belong." In addition, there is an
identifiable pattern whereby disproportionately large numbers of
nonwhite students are being labeled as mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed. 1 2 Such practices result in increased segregation, for "[a]s a consequence of these labels, students are settled

into programs
that are segregated on the basis of stigmatizing
3
labels.""11

109. In their brief to the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, the appellants' counsel (which included a then-attorney Thurgood Marshall) summarized
their position as follows:
The phrases-"privileges and immunities," "equal protection," and "due
process"-that were to appear in the [Fourteenth] Amendment had come to
have specific significance to opponents of slavery.... When they translated
the antislavery concepts into constitutional provisions, they employed these
by now traditional phrases that had become freighted with equalitarian
meaning in its widest sense.
Brief for Appellants In Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument
at 235, Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 81 UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, RECORDS AND BRIEFS, October Term 1954.
Justice Marshall, subsequently interpreted Brown, in Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma
City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting) where he stated, in considering whether to lift a desegregation decree, "I believe a desegregation decree cannot
be lifted so long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in
Brown I persist and there remain feasible methods of eliminating such conditions."
110. Days, supra note 108, at 55 (footnote omitted).
111. Id.
112. Finesse G. Couch, Not Just Another Brown Analysis: A Callfor Public Education Reform, 20 N.C. CEr. L.J. 143, 158 (1993).
113. Id.
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Sound Education Policy versus the Law: Bilingual Education

The same issue regarding minority isolation appears in the controversy over bilingual education as well. From the standpoint of
its advocates, bilingual education represents a clear right and benefit. "Undoubtedly the issue of bilingual education touches the
sense of belonging, and undoubtedly that sense is vital to every
'
Some advocates believe that,
person's identity and self-esteem." 114
when placed in English-speaking classes, children who are of limited English proficiency are effectively precluded from receiving a
meaningful education. 115 On the other hand, critics of bilingual
programs feel that these programs have segregative effects that are
clearly wrong, if not unconstitutional. 16 Such disagreements have
heavily involved the courts, and the statutes and administrative
regulations that have ensued.
In Lau v. Nichols,"7 non-English speaking Chinese students in
San Francisco alleged that teaching classes in English only deprived
them of a meaningful education. 118 The Supreme Court agreed,
ruling that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196419 required compensatory programs for the students. 2 0 The Court, in an opinion
by Justice Douglas, noted that "there is no equality of treatment
merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks,
teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education. "121
As a result of Lau, many have assumed that the Supreme Court
ordered bilingual education; the Court, in fact, did not do so.
Rather than mandating bilingual education, the Court acknowledged that there is a wide variety of ways to handle the special
needs of non-English speaking students.12 2 It said "[t]eaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the lan114. Karst, supra note 90, at 356.
115. Fred M. Hechinger, Coming to Terms with Bilingualism in New York City Pub-

lic Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1988, at Sec. 4, p. 6; Edward B. Fiske, The Controversy over Bilingual Education in America's Schools; One Language or Two?, N.Y.
Nov. 10, 1985, at Sec. 12, p. 1.
116. Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual
Education, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1249, 1256-57 (1988).
117. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).

TIMES,

118. Id. at 566.
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)-(e)(16) (1988).
120. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566-68.
121. Id. at 566.
122. See id. at 565 (pointing out that Section 71 of the California Education Code
"permits a school district to determine 'when and under what circumstances instruction may be given bilingually.').
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guage is one choice. Giving instruction to this group in Chinese is
another. There may be others. 12 3 Justice Douglas's failure to be
precise allowed for separation of the Chinese students in San Francisco and began a disastrous path for believers in equality.
Educators and ideological advocates of bilingual education soon
realized that it would be difficult to design compensatory programs
in an integrated setting which would meet the duty imposed by
Lau.124 Did Lau imply that a remedial program providing separate
but more than equal education to minorities was constitutionally
acceptable, or did it require that remedial education be integrated?
As indicated, the precise nature of a bilingual program, if any, was
not spelled out in Lau. There was room for some to say that a
school may teach a child solely in the native language, because the
essence of Lau went to the right to an effective education. Beyond
that, isolating foreign language speakers was not necessarily opposed by many advocates of bilingual education, and by mainstream educators who sought to exclude the foreign language
speakers.
The pressure soon mounted, largely at the instigation of ideological advocates of bilingual education, to provide for separate bilingual programs with the additional goal of maintaining cultural
identity. Further, in providing these programs, the tendency was to
ignore issues of segregation when dealing with bilingual programs.
As a result, bilingual programs that are intended to segregate can
be found to satisfy quality of education standards under the way
the law has been read. Yet a broader and fuller reading of 'equal
opportunity education' recognizes that participation in an integrated classroom and the absence of stigmatizing separation is crucial to a child experiencing a truly equal learning experience.
123. Id.
124. Justice Douglas provided no guiding legal standard to govern school practice.
Instead, he phrased the duty in the negative: the San Francisco school district had a
contractual duty - based on its receipt of federal funds - not to violate the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1). Id. at 566-69. Under contractual
requirements, the school needed to comply with the duties imposed by federal regulations enacted to effectuate the goals of the Civil Rights Act. 414 U.S. at 568-69 (citing
regulations 45 CFR §§ 80 et seq.). Such regulations included the requirements to ensure that non-English speaking students be given sufficient special treatment to level
the playing field and be judged by standards which accounted for their initial language
deficiency. Id. Schools also had the duty to ensure that students were not discriminated against and not deprived of benefits. Id. Indeed, Justice Douglas refused to
define the limits of federal authority to dictate school practices (based upon the contractual duty) stating simply that "they have not been reached here." Id. at 569.
Moreover, Justice Douglas provided no overarching framework which reflected sound
education policy.
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The limited English-speaking child has the right to obtain a
meaningful education in an integrated environment. For some this
means that "[o]nly those children whose inability to comprehend
English results in their absolute exclusion from effective participa125
tion in schooling are eligible for bilingual education programs.
While bilingual segregation is protected under the law, 2 6 some educators believe that a great deal of damage results from the belief
group is incapable of learning with another "suthat one "inferior"
127
perior" group.
In the instances when the conflict between desegregation and bilingual education have been squarely presented to the courts, the
rulings have tended to support Biown and desegregation, implying
that inclusion is a primary goal of American education. 128 But this
perspective has not been promoted in school practice. Any bilingual program that does not result in the return of the child to an
integrated classroom serves further to exclude the child, flies in the
face of equality, and is against sound school practice. Yet, it is a
common phenomenon, with students captured in separated settings
by political interests. Justice Douglas focused on remedying the
problem of teaching students who did not speak English. Pursuant
to that end, he provided alternative possible solutions for the
problems facing non-English speaking student. The imprecision of
the decision has allowed for schools to adopt the exclusive options
provided in the opinion.
D.

Judicial Sensitivity in Religion in the Classroom Cases

As with bilingual programs that segregate, religious programs in
the public school have the danger of excluding some children from
full participation. As Kenneth Karst states:
The Supreme Court's decisions on schoolhouse religion are
understood easily. The problem of officially sponsored school
prayer-even watered-down "nondenominational" prayer-is
not merely that it lends some perfunctory government support
125. Terri Lynn Newman, Comment, Bilingual Education Guidelinesfor the Courts
and the Schools, 33 EMORY L.J. 577, 599-600 (1984).
126. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 565 (1973).
127. See supra part I at pp. 411-14.
128. See Newman, supra note 125, at 621 (citing Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d
465, 480 (10th Cir. 1975) (the students have the right to the opportunity to learn in
English), Martin Luther King Junior Elementary Sch. Children v. Ann Arbor Sch.
Dist. Bd., 473 F.Supp. 1371, 1372 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (the goal of the school must be to
teach students in English).
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to Christianity, to Judaic-Christian monotheism, or to religion in
general.
Additionally, government sanctioned prayer tells school children who do not share the dominant religious faiths represented
by the prayer that they are outsiders, that they do not belong as
full members of the community.... The school board's message
to the religious outsider is clear: 'This is our town." 12 9
The Supreme Court decisions on religion in the public schools
have reflected this concern. In Engel v. Vitale, 3 ° the Court invalidated the practice of government-sponsored prayer in the public
schools.' 31 The practice was invalidated despite the fact that the
prayer was denominationally neutral and despite the fact that students who did not wish to participate were excused from doing so
or permitted to leave the classroom. 132 The Court had little regard
for these precautions and held the New York rule constituted a
state sponsored religious practice in the classroom which violated
the First Amendment. 133 And the Court clearly annunciated First
Amendment policy in striking the rule- to protect against the diminorities living under
vision, ostracism and scorn which occasions
3
a governmentally mandated religion.1 1
A year after Engel, in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 35 the Supreme Court ruled that a law requiring all public schools to begin the day with a reading from the Bible was unconstitutional.136 Once again, a provision allowing students who
did not wish to participate to leave the classroom or remain silent
did not save the practice. 37 The Court did the same in Chamberlin
v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction138 a year later by suc129. Karst, supra note 90, at 358-59.
130. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
131. Id
132. Id. at 423-24.
133. Id at 430 (stating that "[t]here can be no doubt that New York's state prayer
program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer.").
134. According to Justice Black, this policy was basic to the critical First Amendment goal of protecting minorities from the scorn and ostracism they would indubitably suffer should a governmentally mandated religion exist:
[tlhe history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in
this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one
particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred
the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
135. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 205-207.
138. 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
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cintly holding that a state practice of reciting the Lord's Prayer in
public schools is unconstitutional even though the school allowed
children for whom objection was taken the option of being excused. The guiding policy of the First Amendment was delineated
in Schempp, where the Court clearly stated that religious minorities
were protected against any139state invasion, however minor, of their
right to religious freedom.
Essentially, the legal rationale for these Supreme Court decisions was that government sponsored religious activities violated
the Establishment Clause in that their purpose and primary effect
was to aid religion. 140 The issue of religious programs in schools
has, in fact, been part of the larger question of church and state
where the Supreme Court has taken a strong stance that some
commentators charge as discrimination against religious practice.
In Engel, however, Justice Black also made mention of the 'coercion' factor. 141 He suggested that "laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship [may in fact] involve coercion,"
for "[w]hen the power, prestige, and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain."' 42
When considering the issue of school prayer, at least from a
child's viewpoint, coercion has become a critical factor. Commentators agreeing with the results of the Engel and Schempp decision
have mentioned the coercion issue as a policy concern apart from
the scope of the legal Establishment Clause analysis. 43 The coercion issue recently has taken on importance not only as a policy
concern but also as a legal factor in determining an Establishment
Clause violation. Under Lee v. Weisman, 44 decided in 1992, "coercion" has moved from a policy issue outside an Establishment
145
Clause test to become a central component of the test itself.
139. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
140. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224;

Chamberlin,377 U.S. at 402.
141. Engel, 370 U.S. at 429-33.
142. Id. at 431.

143. Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School PrayerAmendment, 50 U. CHI.
REV. 823, 835 (1983).
144. 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
145. Id. at 587 (Justice Kennedy states "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a
L.

[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'" (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465

U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
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Although the Engel court did not base its decision on the coercion
factor, in today's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is appropriate to return to, and focus upon, the coercion aspect of school
prayer. In a sense, then, in these school prayer cases, there has
been judicial recognition of the importance of inclusion in the
146
school's activities, and the negative impact of exclusion.
In Lee, the Court held that a practice of directing a school-initiated and monitored graduation prayer violated the Establishment
Clause by coercing participation in a religious practice within the
public school setting. Justice Kennedy observed that prayer in the
public school setting raises "heightened concerns with protecting
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure.' 1 47 According to Justice Kennedy, "[t]he undeniable fact is that the school
district's supervision and control of the high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students. . . .,,8 Once again, the voluntary nature of
participation could not save the practice. Despite the fact that
both attendance at the ceremony and participation in the prayer
were voluntary, the school's choice to have the prayer was seen as
imposing illegitimate social, or peer pressure. 49 The students who
objected would have to exclude themselves.
If this analysis is true for a one-time prayer at a high school graduation ceremony where attendance is voluntary, then there is certainly undue coercion in a daily prayer in public schools where
attendance is compulsory. The "coercion" reasoning in Engel and,
more explicitly, in Lee, recognizes that "voluntary" is a highly relative term. Simply allowing an exit option for a child does not justify the prayer. The price the child must pay for not participating is
exclusion (whether physical or symbolic), and this is too high a
price. Children who are members of a religious minority are especially sensitive to the indirect coercion which comes from peer
146. The Court is certainly sensitive to protecting the child's right to be included in
school activity in a manner that it does not necessarily grant adults. On the issue of a
religious invocation in a school graduation ceremony, Justice Kennedy stated:
[i]nherent differences between the public school system and a session of a
State Legislature distinguish this case from Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983)....
The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state legislature where adults are free
to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons cannot compare
with the constraining potential of the one school event most important for the student
to attend. Lee, 505 U.S. at 596-97.
147. Id at 592.
148. Id. at 593.
149. Id. at 593-94.
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pressure, and the pressure to conform. 150 Students will often sucthis pressure and act in ways contrary to their true
cumb to
15 1
beliefs.
As Justice Frankfurter explained in his concurrence in McCollum v. Board of Education:
That a child is offered an alternative [to participation] may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside
the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children. The
result is an obvious pressure upon children to [conform]. 52
Justice Stevens cited Justice Frankfurter in another school prayer
case, Wallace v. Jaffree.153 In Jaffree, the Court invalidated an
amended Alabama statute which required that each school day
open with a moment of silence for meditation "or voluntary
prayer." Justice Stevens noted that while the availability of nonparticipation served to "'reduce the constraint, it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school.. .outside [of its] domain. The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an
outstanding characteristic of children.' 1'54
The stigma of exclusion from the classroom has also been raised
in the context of religious challenges to curricular decisions. Some
suggest that children leave the classroom when "objectionable"
literature is assigned. In rejecting this "exclusion" option, one commentator notes that children and teenagers who are separated from
on by
their peers generally suffer humiliation and indignity brought
155
classmates.
mainstream
from
cruelty
the subsequent
150. Stone, supra note 143, at 836. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-94
(1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
151. Stone, supra note 143, at 836.
152. 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
153. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
154. Id at 61 n.51 (quoting J. Frankfurter).
155. Attention must also be given to the emotional effects that substitution or
exclusion may have on the child. Children, particularly teenagers, are
acutely conscious of differences among students. Requiring a student to
leave class in front of peers is often embarrassing, and the child may be subject to challenge or ridicule later.... Besides this awkwardness, ostracism is
inherent in a remedy of exclusion.
Shobe, supra note 92, at 118-19.
Of course, when the issue turns to the right of children to organize their own activities within school, and unsponsored by school officials, the Court has been understandably more tolerant both from the standpoint of exclusion and from the
Establishment clause as well. After all, an important component of the First Amendment is the Free Exercise clause that extends substantial freedom to individuals to
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In sum, analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the
area of school prayer yields the conclusion that the Court positively attempts to act in a manner which has good educational policy ramifications.156 In defending the First Amendment, the Court
has tangentially leaned toward adopting inclusionary policies.
E.

Judicial Sensitivity in Patriotism Cases

The issues of coercion and exclusion are also raised in the cases
which have dealt with the practice of saluting the flag in the classroom. In this situation, the Court reached something of a different
result, by permitting flag salute. Because in Barnette,157 the government was using the school to foster allegiance to the state, a
legitimate function of the government, the Court was willing to offset the children's competing interest of being free of pressure to
conform. Although the results may seem different from the prayer
cases, the underlying concern of the Court in both the prayer cases
and in Barnette is the same: to avoid, as much as possible, a situation wherein a child must conform or leave the classroom.
Although the Supreme Court would not ban the pledge of the
flag entirely and eliminate any coercion, it did ban mandatory flag
saluting, thereby eliminating the need for the non-conforming child
to actually leave the classroom or pledge. The Supreme Court
seems to have been very sensitive to the plight of the child who
"undoubtedly feels confused and isolated when she is told that she
cannot participate in class activities such as ...the daily routine of
a flag salute."' 58 And the Court has been sensitive to both coercive state and peer pressures which students might face . 5 9Justice
O'Connor best described the dilemma facing a student whose beexercise these rights to practice religion. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (where the Court protected a religious students' group's right to meet on a
University campus after hours). See also Stone, supra note 143, at 845.
156. Indeed, in the Lee v. Weisman school prayer case, the Court looked to nonlegal materials in an attempt to accomodate students' special needs. Specifically, Justice Kennedy considered several sociological studies on the role and effects of peer
pressure in school. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992).
157. West Virginia State Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
158. Shobe, supra note 92, at 119.
159. See supra notes 145-46 and text accompanying note 134. In the Barnette case,
the Court considered a primitive and awkward flag salute rule, which was grounds for
the discipline and expulsion of non-complying Jehovah's Witnesses. Barnette, 319
U.S. at 629. Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson delivered the following, oft-repeated constitutional doctrine:
[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional contstellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
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liefs conflict with a school-mandated practice. She said that the
student is "left with the choice of participating, thereby compro-

mising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing, thereby calling
attention to his or her nonconformity".160 1t is clear that the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to school prayer and

flag salute, understands that the public school classroom must be a
place where all children are made to feel that they belong.
F. The Disability Cases

Inclusion seems to be receiving a great deal of interest in the
area of educating children with disabilities. After a long history of

exclusion from public school,' 6 ' followed by a period of placement
in isolated school settings, the concept of the "least restrictive envi-

ronment"'162 as fully inclusive appears to be gaining momentum.
Although the federal special education law, the Education of the
Handicapped Act (EHA) 163 has been law since 1970, its implemen-

tation has been inconsistent. Early cases, in fact, focused on providing educational services and on permitting students with severe
handicapping conditions to attend school. 1 64 More recently, howword or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us.
Id. at 642.
160. Shobe, supra note 92, at 118 n.38 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)).
161. See Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act: A Parent's Perspectiveand Proposalfor Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 331, 343 n. 40 (1980)
(discussing numerous statutes from a variety of states, including Pennsylvania (PA.
24, § 13-1375 (1962)), Nebraska, (NEB. REV.STAT. §§ 79-201, 79-202
STAT. Aa. tit.
(1971)), and Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 115-165 (1966)) which all provided for the
exclusion of children with disabilities from public schools).
162. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) and 34 CFR §§ 300.550-.556 (1995). 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.550(b)(1)-(2) spells out the clear statutory purpose:
(1) that to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabiliites, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are non-disabled; and
(2) that special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with
disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550(b)(1)-(2) (1995).
163. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 - 1491 (1990). The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act was originally enacted in 1970 as the "Education of the Handicapped Act"
VI § 601, 84 and amended in 1975 by "The Education
(EHA), Pub. L. No. 91-230, tit.
for All Handicapped Children Act" (EAHCA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774
(1975). See also Kotler, supra note 161, at 331 n. 3.
164. See, e.g., Eberle v. Bd.of Pub. Educ., 444 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D. Pa. 1977), aff'd,
582 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1978)(inter-preting the main purpose of the act to be to provide
funding for special education schools) and Mrs. A. J. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,478 F.
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ever, the emphasis has been on justifying why handicapped students should not be included in regular classes rather than
segregated in self-contained classes only for special education students. 165 Realizing that students in segregated settings do not do as
well as when they are in integrated settings, parents of these
youngsters and their advocates have been demanding school sys-

tems justify the unequal placement of these youngsters.
Such a position, of wanting students with disabilities in the regu-

lar classes, has taken extraordinary courage on the part of many of
these advocates. These parents and their advocates are sacrificing
input measures of education' 66 for one that-if properly developed-results rather in more integrated and better lifelong out-

comes for these youngsters.
The Supreme Court's first foray into the matter of interpreting
the EHA occurred in Board of Education v. Rowley, 16 7 where the
Court rejected the notion that free appropriate education means
maximizing each child's potential commensurate with all other
children. Instead, the Court held that the EHA only required that
disabled children gain access to individually designed specialized
instruction and related services fashioned to provide educational

benefit to the disabled.168 The emphasis in Rowley was on access,
169
rather than on the substantive quality of the education received.

Supp. 418, 431 (D. Minn. 1979)(stating that the EHA "was enacted to insure that all
handicapped children are afforded a free appropriate public education which concentrates on the unique needs of the individual student."). The court also viewed the
EHA as a mechanism providing handicapped students with procedual protection relating to parents' and students' decisions relating to the students' right to a "free appropriate public education."). Mrs. A. J., 478 F. Supp. at 431.
165. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-.556. See, e.g., Oberti by
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that IDEA's mainstreaming requirement prohibited a school from placing a child with disabilities outstide of a regular classroom unless integrated education could not be achieved
satisfactorily by the use of supplementary aids); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874
F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the Congressional requirement that a
school district, to the maximum extent reasonably possible, attempt to teach handicapped students alongside their non-handicapped peers).
166. Input measures of education are usually more costly and in a staff intensive
isolated setting.
167. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
168. Kotler, supra note 161, at 337.
169. At issue in Rowley was whether Amy, a deaf child, required a sign language
interpreter in her classroom. The school board designed an indivdualized education
program (IEP), per 14 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5), which included both integrated classroom
education (supplemented by the use of a hearing aid) and additional, non-integrated,
outside tutorial and speech therapy education. After employing an interpreter for
two weeks, the Board concluded that an interpreter was unecessary. Amy's parents,
who were in favor of the employment of an interpreter, challenged the decision in
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Regarding whether Amy Rowley was receiving an "appropriate"
education as required under the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 7 ° the Supreme Court held that
the EAHCA "was more to open the door of public education to
handicapped children on appropriate terms 1than to guarantee any
17
particular level of education once inside.'
This represented a very limited reading of the EHA.
In its search for the congressional intent in passing [the EHA],
the Court also ignored a major indication of that intent-the
Congressional Findings-which speaks of 'full equality of opportunity'. 172 Instead, the Court looked at the legislative history
and stressed references to exclusion from 1education
as evidence
73
goal.
legislative
the
was
access
mere
that
Subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of the statute, however, show support for the principle of inclusion. In Honig v.
Doe, 7 4 the Court was faced with the question of how a school
board should treat emotionally disturbed children who behaved
disruptively. The Supreme Court interpreted a "stay put" provision of EAHCA' 75-a provision which provides that the child remain in regular class pending the outcome of an EHA proceeding
brought to determine if the education methods need be alteredbe enforced even under dangerous circumstances. 76 It supported
federal court. Rowley v. Bd. of Ed., 483 F. Supp. 528, 529-531 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The
Supreme Court affirmed the educators' decision, and reasoned that "when the 'mainstreaming' preference of the act has been met and a child is being educated in the
regular classrooms, the system itself monitors the educational progress of the child."
Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd.Of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202-03 (1981).
170. Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 - 1491
(1990).
171. Hendrick Hudson, 458 U.S. at 192. See also Patricia Young Taylor, Note, An
'Appropriate' Education for the Handicapped - Board of Education v. Rowley, 26
How. L.J. 1645, 1659 (1983).
172. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(3), which states that
"more than half of the children with disabilities in the United States do not
receive appropriate educational services which would enable them to have
full equality of opportunity."
173. Philip William Clements, Note, Education - Board of Education v. Rowley:
The Supreme Court Takes a Conservative Approach to the Educationof Handicapped
Children, 61 N.C. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983).
174. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
175. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).
176. Honig, 484 U.S. at 323. Congress subsequently modified the statute to provide
that disabled children who have brought a firearm to school may be removed from
class for not more than 45 days, pending the outcome of an EHA proceeding to determine how the child should be educated. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(3)(A) & (B).
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the legislature's disinclination
to exclude a child while placement
177
proceedings were pending.

Since 1989, a series of decisions in lower federal courts have
demonstrated the judiciary's willingness to promote the cause of
inclusion in the education of students with disabilities. 178 The decisions in these cases-which require that before denying the student
the opportunity to be in an inclusive setting that the school districts
must demonstrate that placement in the regular class setting with
appropriate support services and supplementary aids will not provide educational benefit-demonstrates a great sensitivity to the
educational value of inclusion. 79 As indicated throughout this Ar-

ticle, such cases demonstrate the extent to which equality has great
significance for some courts and for educators. The Supreme
Court decisions seem to send a message that we must be on guard
against measures which 'fence out' children from the classroom
community and give them the feeling that they do not belong. The
public school classroom environment must embrace all children,

and not limit them to segregated environments wherein they must
seek 'solace for exclusion.' "180
177. Honig, 484 U.S. at 323-27. Justice Brennan refused to imply a "dangerousness" exception to the "unequivocal" language of the statute. Id. at 323.
178. See, e.g., Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied
115 S.Ct. 428 (1994) (holding that state standards of quality which are higher than
IDEA's standards are enforceable in federal court under IDEA); Oberti by Oberti v.
Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer by Greer v. Rome City School Dist.,
950 F.2d 688, 695-96 (11th Cir. 1991), opinion withdrawn, 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir.
1992), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
Rowley was irrelevant to "mainstreaming" determinations under IDEA); see discussion supra note 165.

For a detailed analysis of other recent caselaw, see DIANE
EDuc.

LIPTON, NAT'L CTR. ON

RESTRUCTURING AND INCLUSION, THE GRADUATE SCHOOL AND UNIV. CTR.,

THE CITY UNIV. OF NEW YORK, THE "FULL INCLUSION" COURT CASES:

1989-1994,

BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL CENTER ON EDUCATIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND INCLUSION, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994).

179. See, e.g., Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989)
where the court stated:
[i]n short, the Act's mandate for a free appropriate public education qualifies and limits its mandate for education in the regular classroom. Schools'
must provide a free appropriate public education and must do so, to the
maximum extent appropriate, in regular education classrooms. But when
education in a regular classroom cannot meet the handicapped child's
unique needs, the presumption in favor of mainstreaming is overcome and
the school need not place the child in regular education. (Emphasis added).
See also Greer, 950 F.2d at 695-96 (11th Cir. 1991) (which adopted the Fifth Circuit
test).
180. Karst, supra note 90, at 327.
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The Supreme Court should be commended for recognizing the
value of inclusiveness in the education process when it does so.
And it has effectuated this policy well in areas of religion and patriotism in the classroom. In cases regarding educating non-English
speakers and students with disabilities, the Court has not adopted
the same inclusive policy as clearly as it has in cases of racial segregation of students. The Court should adopt a unifying, inclusionary
education policy. In its approach to education cases, the Court
should start from the position that it is better to include and integrate children than to separate them.
III. Thinking About Difference(s)
The cases discussed above-school prayer and flag saluting, racial discrimination, students whose native language is not English,
and students with disabilities-have, at bottom, a common concern
with how to treat difference; indeed, how to formulate and understand difference, what Martha Minow calls "the dilemma of
difference.' ' 181
The dilemma of difference may be posed as a choice between
integration and separation, as a choice between similar treatment and special treatment, or as a choice between neutrality
and accommodation. Government neutrality may be the best
way to assure equality, yet governmental neutrality may also
freeze in place the past consequences of differences. Do the
public schools fulfill their obligation to provide equal opportunities by including all students in the same integrated classroom,
or by offering some students special programs tailored to their
Special needs arise from 'differences' beyond lanneeds?'
guage proficiency and physical or mental disability. Religious
differences 8 3also raise questions of same versus different
treatment.1
Minow captures the tension which faces policy makers, courts, and
administrators when they focus on the issue of equality. "The
problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating mem181.

MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,

AND AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990).

182. This presents a false dichotomy. Inclusive education programs, that is those
which place students with disabilities in general education classes with the necessary
supplementary aids and supports, provide both integrated placement and attention to
"difference."

NAT'L CTR. ON EDUC. RESTRUCTURING AND INCLUSION, THE GRADUATE SCHOOL AND UNIV. CTR., THE CITY UNIV. OF NEW YORK, NATIONAL STUDY OF
INCLUSIVE EDUCATION

(1995).

183. See MINOW, supra note 181, at 20-21.
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bers of minority groups the same as members of the majority and
by treating the two groups differently.' 1 84 Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adopted in 1982,185 seeks to
strike a balance between traditional equality and attention to "difference;" it states:
1. Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age, or mental or physical disability.
2. Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program, or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.
Addressing this balance in the context of disability, which has
been an area of growing controversy, Robert Funk, a founder of
the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF), argues that equal opportunity programs must be based upon the realities facing the disabled and that remedial programs must account
1 86
for that reality to maximize those students' potential.
Although this balance marks an advance over the current equation of "difference" with deviance, it perpetuates the formulation
that the "difference" resides in the individual with its pernicious
consequences.
Few tragedies can be more extensive than the stunting of life,
few injustices deeper than the denial of opportunity to strive or
even to hope, by a limit imposed from without, but falsely laying
as within ....

We inhabit a world of human differences and

predilections, but the extrapolation
of these facts to theories of
187
rigid limits is ideology.

So, too, disability- rights theoreticians challenge the traditional
paradigm of disability, rejecting the individual deficit model, which
sees the disability in terms of the individual's shortcoming. They
argue for a sociopolitical definition, one which regards the disability as a common problem that requires us all to deal with it, rather
184. Id. at 20.
185. CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 15.
186. Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of Civil
Rights, IMAGES OF THE DISABLED: DISABLING IMAGES 7, 24 (Alan Gartner & Tom

Joe eds.) (1987).
187. STEPHEN JAY

GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN

28-29 (1981).
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than see it as someone else's problem. This has the effect of diminishing an individual's particularistic rights, and proposing an entitlement to a level of what is seen as a common good.
Minow calls for a "social-relations approach," as providing an
alternative to traditional legal treatments of difference.
This approach especially rejects distinctions drawn between people which express or confirm the distribution of power in ways
that harm the less powerful. The social-relations approach has
its roots in a dramatic shift of attention during the twentieth
century-across the sciences, social sciences, and humanitiestoward relationships rather than to the discrete items under observation. For many, this shift has brought a new focus on relationship between people within which individuals develop a
sense of autonomy and identity. For others, the shift turns to
the relationship between the knower and the known .... Another topic of attention is the relationship between the parts and
the wholes, and still another is the mutual dependence of theory
and context. From work in relativity theory and the indeterminacy principle in physics to deconstructive strategies in literary
scholars
interpretation, these relational concerns are occupying
188
fields.
their
of
assumptions
the
to
challenges
in
This approach allows for switching from a focus on the "different"
person to the social and legal construction of differences.
[T]he assumptions about difference [are] deeply entrenched in
our social institutions, and in the legal rules that govern them.
One assumption treats difference as inherent in the 'different'
person rather than a function of comparisons; another assumption establishes as the norm for comparison the experience of
only some people, such as English-speaking students, 189 or white
men, or able-bodied persons; a third assumption imagines an
'objective' observer who can see without a perspective, uninflu188. See MINOW, supra note 181, at 379-80.
189. When a majority fails to acknowledge and respect a minority's difference, children know it and the message damages their self-esteem and ability to succeed. Leonard Covello, the first New York City Public School principal of Italian heritage,
describes his experiences at the beginning of the century.
The Italian language was completely ignored in the American school. In
fact, throughout my whole elementary school career, I do not recall one
mention of Italy, or the Italian language or what famous Italians had done in
We soon got the
the world, with the possible exception of Columbus ....
idea that 'Italian' meant something inferior, and a barrier was erected between children of Italian origin and their parents. This was the accepted
process of Americanization. We were becoming Americans by learning how
to be ashamed of our parents. Quoted in CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN
THE CLASSROOM

58 (1970).
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enced by situation or experience. Differences perceived by
judges, employers, and school administrators seem natural and
inevitable .... 190
At its core, the solution when it gets to the Supreme Court requires
that the Court not just decide the case, but that it point us-the
citizenry-in a certain direction, and that we try to keep faith with
the rule of law. The urge toward equality has to be encouraged
and we must be charged with framing its meaning.
A.

Reframing Perceptions: Proposed Approaches

The difference dilemma becomes less paralyzing if we question
the assumptions regarding difference and try to look at the issue
from another point of view. For example, in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,191 Justice Stevens, concurring with the
Court's decision to strike a Cleburne, Texas, ordinance which
barred a group home for mentally retarded people, wrote, "I cannot believe that a rational member of this disadvantaged class
could ever approve of the discriminatory application of the city's
ordinance in this case. ' 192
Hahn, a leading disability rights theorist, frames the issue as one
of how we view and treat difference, as an abnormality or as an
aspect of the human condition. 193 He points out, that as with other
disadvantaged groups (e.g., women, African-Americans, Latinos,
Native Americans, Asian-Americans, gays and lesbians, and aging
individuals), people with disabilities are striving to translate previously devalued personal characteristics into a positive sense of selfidentity. 94 He writes, "a consciousness that disability simply signifies another human difference instead of functional restrictions
190. See MINOW, supra note 181, at 375.
191. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). This case involved an application for a permit for a group
home for the mentally handicapped, which had been rejected by the City Council of
Cleburne, Texas. In rejecting the Home's equal protection arguments, the Court held
that the mentally handicapped are not a quasi-suspect class and thus are not subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Yet, applying the rational-relation test, the lowest level of Equal Protection scrutiny, the Court found that
the City of Cleburne offerred no rational reason for rejecting the permit application
and indeed, found the denial was the result of "an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded," and ordered the ordinance be struck. Id. at 450.
192. Id. at 455.
193. Harlan Hahn, New Trends in Disability Studies: Implications for Education
Policy 19/8 (1994) (A paper prepared for the National Center on Educational Restructuring and Inclusion, Invitational Conference on Inclusive Education at the
Wingspread Wisconsin Conference Center).
194. Id.
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might form the basis ... to promote an increased
appreciation of
1 95
diversity and heterogeneity in everyday life.'
Minow, too, connects the experience of people with disabilities
with that of women and minority group members. 196 The fundamental dilemma, under Minow's paradigm, is that disabled people
1 97
are deemed "different" under our current educational policies.
The challenge facing our education system, according to Mvinow, is
to expand the definition of "normal" to include people with disabilities. a98 A system of inclusion, from an early age stands the best
chance of broadening that definition. 199
Biklen, addressing issues of program implementation, says,
"How schools see integration is critical: Is integration understood
as an outsider coming in, or as creating a school culture so that it
accepts all comers? ' 2 0 0 Biklen's use of the word "integration,"
with its connotation of race relations, is significant. It reminds us
that real integration can be achieved not by "allowing" persons of
color into the existing white society but only as that society is itself
transformed. This point is echoed by Minow: Integration alone
will fail unless minorities are accepted as equals, and outmoded
stereotypes and biases are eliminated. 0 ' Current school practices
often appear to be inattentive to the issue of the full meaning of
equality, to enshrine a negative conceptualization of difference, especially in procedures for "certifying" students as "handicapped"
and in need of special education services. A litany of "due process" requirements provide a patina of fairness, while perpetuating
the stigma of difference. "Impartiality is the guise that partiality
takes to seal bias against exposure. 2 10 2 Although such procedures
challenge the exclusion of "different" people from schools and
195. Id.
196. See

MINOW,

supra note 181, at 90-93.

197. Id. at 81-82.
198. Id. at 94-97.
199. Id. at 95.
200. Is THERE A

DESK WITH

My

NAME ON IT? THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION

(1993).
201. Integration ...

offers no solution unless the majority itself changes by

sharing power, accepting members of the minority as equal participants and
resisting the temptation to attribute as personal inadequacies the legacy of
disadvantage experienced by the group. Neither separation nor integration
can eradicate the meaning of difference in a minority group that does not fit
the world designed for the majority.
MINOW, supra note 181, at 25.
202. Id. at 376.

3
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other public programs, they "fail to supply a '20basis
for remaking
3
those institutions to accommodate difference.
"Forging ways out of the difference dilemma requires remaking
institutions so that they do not establish one norm that places the
burden of difference on those who diverge from it." 2°4 Programs of
inclusive education (i.e., providing opportunities in general education classes for students with disabilities) offer examples of ways to
overcome the difference diemma. They go beyond a "readiness"
model which, as Stephen J. Taylor 215 points out, requires that students with disabilities "prove" their readiness to be in an integrated setting, rather than seeing that setting as the norm, both as a
moral standard and a pedagogic desiratum. And programs of inclusive education go beyond programs of "mainstreaming," which
posit two separate systems, general and special education. Rather,
inclusive education programs require a restructured school system,
one which is unitary and successful for all, one in which all the
children are in the mainstream.
Minow points out that the options considered in providing services for Amy Rowley (of Rowley v. Board of Education20 6 ), a deaf
student, "assumed that the problem was Amy's: because she was
different from other students, the solution must focus on her. "207
Implicit here was a conceptualization of teaching and learning that
posited a one-to-one relationship between teacher and student:
the teacher teaches and the student learns. Instead, however, one
can conceptualize the class as a learning community and Amy as a
collaborative "worker" with her classmates. This shifts the focus
from Amy and makes the problem-and the remedy-one that involves all the students. It is impossible for any court to mandate
such a result. Under a model of inclusion that is encouraged by
our belief in equality, Amy would learn, in sign language, alongside
her peers, and in that process her peers would learn to communicate with Amy.20 8 The benefits of this approach are numerous:
students would have the benefit of interacting with and learning
from Amy; students would benefit from learning to communicate
203. Id. at 377.
204. Id at 94.
205. Stephen J. Taylor, Caught in the Continuum: A CriticalAnalysis of the Principle of Least Restrictive Environment,13 JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR PERSONS
WITH SEVERE HANDICAPS, 41 (1988).
206. 458 U.S. 176 (1982)
207. See MINOW, supra note 181, at 82.
208. Id. at 84.
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in a different way; and they would benefit from striving to overcome the obstacles of learning differently. 0 9 Moreover:
when students in the majority avoid the experience of not being
understood, or not understanding what others say, they fail to
learn about the limits of their own knowledge. They miss a
chance to discover the importance of learning another language.
By their very comfort in the situation, they neglect the perspec210
tive of any student they consider different from themselves.

This active involvement of students in their learning process embodies the effective pedagogic approaches noted earlier.211 Such
collaborative efforts provide benefits not only in schooling but in
life beyond the school house. In the post-industrial society, there is
emphasis on collaboration, mutual adjustment, and developing a
community of interests among the organizations' members. Taking
responsibility for their education and learning how to collaborate
with one another, Thomas Skrtic asserts, is essential to students'
later success in the post industrial era. Those educated for life in
this era need to learn to interact with people who have different
backgrounds, skills and experiences. 2
Conclusion
Addressing the role of the adults, Edmonds stated,
(a) We can, whenever and wherever we choose, successfully
teach all children whose schooling is of interest to us;
(b) We already know more than we need to do that; and
(c) Whether or not we do it must finally depend on how we feel
about the fact that we haven't [done it] so far.213
Echoing Edmonds's point about who matters, Dianne L. Ferguson
and others state:
The purpose of schooling is to enable all students to actively
participate in their [school] communities so that others care
209. Id.

210. Id. at 29. Staub and Peck similarly identify benefits to nondisabled students of
participating in inclusive classes, including reduced fear of human differences accompanied by increased comfort and awareness; growth in social cognition; improvements
in self-concept; development of personal principles; and warm and caring friendships.

Staub & Peck, supra note 77, at 37.
211. See supra part I (discussion of effective educational methods).
212. Thomas M. Skrtic, The Special Education Paradox:Equity as the Way to Excellence, 61 HARV. EDuc. REV. 148, 181 (1991).
213. Ronald R. Edmonds, Some Schools Work and More Can, 9 Soc. POL'Y 28, 29
(1979).
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enough about what happens to them to look for a way to include
them as part of that community. 214
Inclusion in the classroom is a matter of concern both to the courts
and educators. A question arises as to the appropriate division of
responsibility between the two. The courts' role is to make explicit
the extent of students' rights and the nature of institutional responsibilities. And the Supreme Court has clearly addressed these issues in its religion and patriotism-in-the- classroom cases: students
have the right to be included, if reasonably possible, and to be
treated similarly to their peers. By so defining the meaning of
equality it can both effectively guide states on the appropriate legal
policy, yet leave educators room to do their jobs effectively. We
therefore urge the judiciary to make decisions which account for
the policies of equality inherent in Brown, and which accord with
sound education practice.

214. Dianne L. Ferguson, et al., Figuring out What to do with The Grownups: How
Teachers Made Inclusion 'Work' for students with disabilities, 17 JOURNAL OF THE
ASSOCIATION FOR PERSONS WITH SERIOUS HANDICAPS 218 (1992).

